




DEPARTAMENTO DE ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO: 
TEORÍA ECONÓMICA E HISTORIA ECONÓMICA 
SCHOOL TO WORK TRANSITIONS AND THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION 
♦ 
Maite Blázquez Cuesta, José Ignacio García-Pérez 
 
 
Working Paper 8/2007 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
         
   1
SCHOOL TO WORK TRANSITIONS AND THE 
IMPACT OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON 
EDUCATION 
         Maite Blázquez Cuesta
1                                        J. Ignacio García-Pérez           
  Universidad Autónoma de Madrid                          U. Pablo Olavide, FCEA & FEDEA          
        
Abstract 
 
In this paper we analyse how the decentralization process of the Spanish educational system has affected 
the school-to-work transition of youths over the last years. Using individual data from the Spanish Labor 
Force Survey for the period 1993-2002, we estimate a simultaneous equation model for the 
unemployment and employment hazard rates of these workers. We include public expenditure on 
education, at the regional level, as an explanatory factor in both hazards. Furthermore we account for 
cross-regional differences regarding the decision-making authority over education. Our results reveal that 
for both, university and non-university levels, public expenditure on education significantly improves the 
chances of Spanish youths in finding the first job after completing the educational system. However, it 
seems that the decentralization of university education has negative effects on youths’ labor market 
prospects in terms of exiting from unemployment, while no effects are observed for the case of non-
university education.  
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1.  Introduction 
A decisive event in the life of most young people is when they leave school and enter the labor 
market. Today’s transition from school to work is often described as a turbulent and uncertain period of 
young people (OECD, 1996b; EUROSTAT, 1997; Galland, 1997; Urquiola et al., 1997).  
Improving the transition from school to the labor market had gradually entered into the political 
and social debate in many OECD countries, and many reforms have been enacted to facilitate this 
transition. Most of the policies aimed at youth are related to the institutional links between school and the 
labor market and the common thread in initiatives to improve the transition has been attempts to develop 
more flexible paths between education/learning and employment (OECD, 1996b). Previous research 
works (Shavit and Müller, 1998; Hannan et al., 1999) have found that institutional settings, and 
particularly educational and training systems and their link to labor market entry, greatly influence 
individual transitions from education to working life. Nonetheless, educational reforms aimed at 
improving school-to-work transitions are not only designed to link education to the job market, but also to 
improve educational quality.  Although, most of empirical work on the effects of human capital on 
economic outcomes has focused on the overall role of school attainments, that is the quantity of 
schooling, recent works have also put attention to quality of education.
2 This literature concentrates on 
the effectiveness of school-to-work programs as well as test-based educational reforms in improving 
school-to-work transitions and more general economic outcomes.  In general, it is found that educational 
reforms should deal with both school-to-work programs in high schools and efforts to raise academic 
achievement through the improvement of educational quality.  
Basically, educational systems are divided into two groups. One is the well-known dual system, 
where students have the choice between an academic or vocational pathway at an early stage. The other 
group includes systems characterized by a range of relations between school and work experience. 
However, it should be noted that in Spain, as in almost all OECD countries, general education is the track 
followed by the large majority of young people. Furthermore, the Spanish public sector has played a key 
role in education. Public expenditure on education has increased significantly over the last decades, and 
local governments have progressively obtained decision-making authority over education. It would be 
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expected therefore that both, public expenditure on education and the decentralization process had 
affected the transition from school to stable work in Spain over the last years. In particular, they might 
have influenced not only the individual probability of leaving the first unemployment period after leaving 
school, but also the stability of the first employment after school. 
In this paper, we concentrate on labor market outcomes of young people after leaving the 
educational system, hereafter called school leavers. We try to address several question regarding school-
to-work transitions in Spain: How well have new school leavers fared in terms of employment an 
unemployment hazard rates?; Do their employment and unemployment probabilities differ across regions 
with and without decision-making authority over education?; How public expenditure on education affect 
the labor market prospects of these people?; How the educational decentralization process has affected 
such prospects?.  
Our results suggest that, devoting higher amounts of funds to education increases the 
opportunities and reduces the time school-leavers spend in finding a job. This is observed for both 
university and non-university education. However, for the case of university education, decentralization 
seems to have negative outcomes in terms of unemployment hazard rates. In contrast, for the case of non-
university education we do not find significant differences between regions with and without decision-
making authority over education when examining the unemployment hazard rates.  
The paper is organized as follows. Next section provides an overview on school-to-work 
transitions. Section 3 focuses on the decentralization process and the experience of the Spanish 
educational system. Section 4 describes the empirical approach to estimate the hazard rates. Section 5 
presents the estimation sample and Section 6 contains the main results. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  School-to-work transitions 
After leaving the high school, individuals are faced with deciding whether to attend university 
education or enter the labor market. This decision is usually taken based on the expected returns of 
investing in university education. If there is competition for good quality jobs, individuals with higher 
educational levels are expected to get more likely a job after finishing education, which obviously 
increases their expected returns from education. In this sense, attending university education is an 
extremely attractive investment alternative from an individual point of view.    4
Over the last decades, the Spanish university system has experienced a rapid expansion. As a 
consequence, the proportion of people with tertiary education in Spain has increased significantly and 
reached similar levels as in other OECD countries.  But investment in human capital is not only made at 
the individual level, but at the aggregate level. In Spain, government’s decisions on education expenditure 
has been gradually transferred to the regional governments over the twenty years following the 
promulgation of the Constitution of 1978, which introduced a quasi-federal system for the territorial 
organization of the state.  
Previous literature has analyzed the effects of education on the transition from education to the 
labor market. Dolado, Felgueroso and Jimeno (2000) find that workers with a university degree have 
higher employment rates than workers with high school or with a college diploma (although this result is 
only observed after 30 years of age). Bover, Arellano and Bentolila (2002) find that holding a university 
degree increases the unemployment hazard rate only at the beginning of the unemployment spell. After 
the third month, the presence of negative duration dependence reduces the exit rates of college graduates 
below those of less educated workers. Bover and Gómez (2004) investigate the determinants of exit rates 
from unemployment to permanent and temporary jobs. Splitting the sample by the type of job found, 
these authors explain the puzzling negative or non-significant effect of university education on the 
unemployment hazard rate in general, found by Bover et al. (2002). They show that having a university 
degree reduces the unemployment hazard rate to a temporary job and increases the one to a permanent 
job. García-Pérez (1997) finds that, for unemployment durations shorter than 12 months, qualified 
workers are more likely to leave unemployment than non-qualified workers. However, the opposite is 
observed when the unemployment duration exceeds 12 months. He also finds that the employment hazard 
rates are substantially lower among qualified workers. 
It seems, therefore, that the effect of education on the Spanish exit rates from unemployment and 
employment has been the subject of study of many papers in the recent literature. However, we do not 
find any study that analyses the impact of regional governments’ decisions on education public 
expenditure over these hazard rates. The question addressed in this paper deals on how these regional 
governments’ decisions affect the successfulness of the transition process from school to work at the 
individual level. Is it possible for instance that, all else equal, individuals attending education at different 
regions face different probabilities of finding a job simply because of differences in the public   5
expenditure on education of their respective regions? If this is the case, then government’s policies in 
terms of education would play an important role in the performance of the labor market.  
In this regard, Spain is an interesting case. After the transition to a democratic regime in the late 
1970s, a process of political devolution has produced a significant transfer of human and financial 
resources from the Central Administration to Regional Governments and Local Corporations. This 
decentralization process has been especially important in the case of education, whose management was 
transferred from the Central Administration to Regional Governments in all the regions but at different 
moments in time. This cross-regional variability claims for an empirical study to examine how the 
transfer of decision-making authority over education has affected school-to-work transitions in Spain over 
the last years.  
 
3.  Decentralization of the educational system: the Spanish 
experience 
Over the last decades there has been a great advocacy of decentralization in educational 
governance. Several interrelated goals drive decentralization initiatives: increased economic development, 
increased management efficiency, redistribution of financial responsibility, democratization, 
neutralization of competing centers of power, and improved quality of education (Weiler, 1993). 
As in other policy areas, decentralization of education implies that local governments obtain 
authority in the allocation of resources (human, material and financial). Thus, through its budgetary 
authority, local governments deal with the educational system’s needs for financial resources. 
One of the major arguments for introducing more decentralized structures of governance is based 
on the claim that decentralization may yield considerable efficiency in the management of educational 
systems. First, decentralization of the educational system is expected to mobilize and generate resources 
that are not available under more centralized conditions. In particular, decentralized systems of education 
do more actively involve a broader range of social institutions and groups contributing resources that, 
under centralized forms of governance, were not available or were used to other purposes. And second, 
decentralized systems can utilize available resources more efficiently, especially in the medium and long 
run. This is based on the assumption that decentralization increases familiarity with local conditions and   6
needs, which would lead to a better match between demand and supply and thus a more efficient 
utilization of limited resources (Cheema and Rondinelly, 1983). 
All these advantages might explain that, in recent years, education decentralization had become a 
popular reform carried out by governments around the world. However, it is necessary to point out that 
decentralization might also have negative consequences if local governments are influenced by local 
elites. In such a case, local needs in terms of education might be deteriorated, and we could observe some 
regions funding education at a much lower level than others. 
 
3.1.      Decentralization process of the Spanish educational system 
Over the last 30 years Spain has experienced a transition from the most centralized to one of the 
most decentralized nations in Europe. This decentralization has taken place in all type of policies but has 
been especially intense in education. This decentralization process began after Franco’s government, 
when the education spending was only 1.78% of Spanish GNP compared to the 5.1% European average.  
From the beginning of the transition through the mid-1990s, the growth in expenditures on education was 
greater than 2.3 times the growth in the GDP
3. And in 1996 educational expenditures represented more 
than 5 percent of GDP. 
Spain is one of the few countries to have implemented a far-reaching educational 
decentralization reform systematically and completely. This process took place in two stages and with 
differences between university and non-university education. The details of this decentralization process 
were developed in the decentralization law passed in 1980, “Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las 
Comunidades Autónomas” (LOFCA). In the early eighties, 7 out of the 17 Autonomous Communities, or 
regions, in Spain obtained education spending responsibilities. First, competences in non-university 
education were transferred to: Catalunya, Basque Country, Andalusia, Galicia, Canary Islands and 
Valencian Community between 1980 and 1983, and to Navarra in 1990. Then, competences in university 
education were transferred to the first six regions in 1985 and 1986, and to Navarra in 1990. In 1990 the 
Law on the General Organization of the Educational System (LOGSE) stalled the decentralization process 
of the rest of Autonomous Communities until 1998. But, in these regions the competences in university 
education were first transferred, between 1995 and 1997, and finally those in non-university education 
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between 1997 and 2000. On January 1, 2000, after a 20-year decentralization process, the 17 regional 
governments received the complete decision-making authority over education. 
Educational decentralization implies the fund transfers to the decentralized Autonomous 
Communities in the form of tax-sharing block grants. The decentralized regions establish their own public 
expenditure budget priorities, with some regions devoting higher amounts of funds to education than 
others. Previous studies provide evidence that the decentralization process has seemed to positively affect 
education expenditures in those regions with education spending responsibilities. A previous work
4 has 
showed that during the period 1980-1992, five of the seven decentralized regions increased their per 
capita education expenditures in relation to the mean of the 17 Autonomous Communities. This increase 
was very significant for the Basque Country (from 4.05% above the mean in 1980 to 20.44% above in 
1992).  Of the 10 regions under control of the Ministry of Education during that period, seven lost ground 
to the mean of the 17 regions. In the rest of the centralized regions the positive variations were not nearly 
as great as in the decentralized regions.  
It seems, therefore, that the ability to set public expenditure priorities in the decentralized regions 
accounted for a significant measure of the increase in educational spending in these regions.  However, an 
issue that has not been addressed so far is how decentralization of the educational system and public 
expenditure on education have affected the school-to-work transitions in Spain in the last years.  
4.  The empirical approach 
Unemployment and employment hazard rates have been considered by many analysts as good 
indicators of labor market performance, especially during the transition period from school to work. For 
instance, the length of the search period after completing education is a key policy issue both because of 
its implications for public costs and because of its impact upon the supply of qualified labor at a time 
when populations are ageing. 
In order to study the hazard rate for both employment and unemployment, we use a discrete-time 
duration model (see Lancaster, 1990, or Jenkins, 1995 for the basic features of such models). In general, 
the hazard rates we will estimate are given by the following conditional probability: 
  () P r ( | ) tT t T t φ = =≥  (1) 
                                                 
4 E. Uriel, M.L., Moltó, F. Pérez, J. Aldás, V. Cucarella. Las cuentas de la educación en España y sus Comunidades 
Autónomas 1980-1992 (Madrid: Fundación Argentaria, 1997) pp 177-178.   8
where T is a discrete random variable denoting either employment or unemployment duration. Following 
Bover et al. (2002) and García-Pérez (1997), we use a logistic distribution to model the hazard rates, so 
that the two conditional exit rates can be written as follows: 
  01 () ( () () () ) U tF t t x t φ θθ = +  (2) 
  01 () ( () () () ) E tF t t x t φ γγ = +  (3) 
where x(t) denotes the vector of explanatory variables, some of them varying with  spell’s duration, t. 
θ0(t) and γ0(t) represent the additive terms of the duration dependence in the hazard rates that we will 
estimate in the most general way as possible. Finally, θ1(t) and γ1(t) are the coefficients for the 
explanatory factors which in general depend on duration. 
In order to avoid the known spurious duration dependence in the hazard rate, generated by the 
presence of unobserved factors, we control for unobserved heterogeneity, so that we have the following 
expressions for the hazard rates: 
  01 (, ) ( () () () ) U tF tt x t φ ηθθ η = ++  (4) 
  01 (, ) ( () () () ) E tF tt x t φ ηγγ η = ++  (5) 
Furthermore, we will estimate the unemployment and employment hazard rates simultaneously 
and assuming that unobserved heterogeneity follows a discrete distribution function with different mass 
points (as used in Heckman and Singer, 1984). In particular, we consider the case of a two-mass-point 
distribution function, and we estimate the model by maximum likelihood. 
The likelihood function considers the three possibilities of censoring present in our data. Firstly, 
unemployment duration may be censored, in which case employment duration is not observed. Secondly, 
we may have a completed unemployment spell and a censored employment one. And finally, both 
unemployment and employment spells may be completed ones, that is, not censored. The individual 
likelihood function with unobserved heterogeneity can easily be constructed, following García-Pérez and 
Muñoz Bullón (2001), as follows:   9
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where tu and te represent unemployment and employment durations, and dui and dei are two indicators that 
allow us to distinguish between censored and completed unemployment and employment spells 
respectively. The log-likelihood function with unobserved heterogeneity then takes the form: 
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where F(η) is the previously described mass point distribution function.. 
 
5.  A first look to the data 
Our sample comes from the individual data of the Spanish Labor Force Survey rotating panel, 
for the period 1993Q1 to 2002Q2. In this survey households are interviewed for a maximum of six 
quarters. Our sample selection consists of people aged 16-35 that, at the first interview, reveal to be in 
either of the two following situations: 1) unemployed looking for a first job, or 2) employed and studying 
one year before. For these individuals we construct two variables measuring, respectively, the duration of 
the search period after completing education and the duration at first job
5.  
For the purpose of this paper we also need data on public expenditure on education. This 
information is offered by the Spanish Ministry of Education
6. In particular we select data on public 
expenditure on university and non-university education at the regional level (Autonomous Communities)
7. 
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Tables 1-4 in the Appendix.   10
As we are interested on the effect of public expenditure on education over the success of young people at 
the first stages of their working life, for each individual in the sample we will use the data on average 
public expenditure of the three years before he/she left the educational system (and started the job search). 
The series on educational expenditure covers the period 1992-2001, and we distinguish between public 
expenditure in university and non-university education. Nonetheless, at the beginning of the period under 
analysis, only Andalusia, the Canary Islands, Catalunya, Valencian Community, Galicia, Navarra and the 
Basque Country present an education department with a specific budget to spend in public education. For 
the rest of the regions, this budget corresponds to the National Ministry of Education, and hence, we have 
decided to assign to each region according to the total people enrolled in both university and non-
university education. That is, we can compare regions with and without decision-making authority over 
education and examine cross-regional differences in terms of educational spending.  
Since 1995, however, the decentralization process of the educational system was restarted.   
Throughout the years 1995, 1996 and 1997, Aragón, Asturias, the Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Castilla y 
León, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura, Madrid, Murcia and La Rioja received decision-making 
authority over university education. The transfer process in terms of non-university education took place 
at different moments in the different regions: the Balearic Islands in 1998; Aragón, Cantabria and La 
Rioja since 1999; Madrid and Murcia in the second semester of 1999; and Asturias, Castilla y León, 
Castilla-La Mancha and Extremadura in 2000. 
As we are interested in public expenditure on education in per-capita terms, we also need 
information on people enrolled in university and non-university education for the period 1992-2001. The 
series of people enrolled in non-university education have been extracted from the Spanish Ministry of 
Education, while data of people enrolled in university education comes from the Spanish Statistics 
Institute.
8   
Tables 2 and 4 in the Appendix show the evolution of the public expenditure in education (in per 
capita terms) for both, university and non-university education.
9 As expected, the numbers corresponding 
to public expenditure in university education are above the ones corresponding to non-university 
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9 In order to construct Tables 2 and 4, we use information provided by Tables 1 and 3 respectively together with 
information on the number of students enrolled in both university and non-university education in each region.   11
education for all the regions. Furthermore, we observe an increasing trend for the expenditure in both 
university and non-university education, except for the Canary Islands and Navarra for which the public 
expenditure  in university education has slightly decreased, in real terms, during the period 1992-2001.  
We can also appreciate some differences between regions. Regarding the series of public 
expenditure in non-university education, it is noteworthy that the Basque Country and Navarra present the 
highest values, both at the beginning and the end of the period. As regards university education, it is 
interesting the case of Navarra. It is the unique region (apart from the Canary Islands) in which we 
observe a decreasing trend in the evolution of public expenditure. Nonetheless, the values at the 
beginning and the end of the period, for this region, are clearly above the corresponding to the rest of 
regions.  
Table 5 contains the definitions for all the variables used in the estimation process. Given that 
the model is designed as a simultaneous recursive system, the issue of identification arises naturally. 
Clearly identification will require exclusion restrictions for some of the exogenous variables of the 
system.  The applied restrictions become clear from this table. The unemployment equation includes the 
following individual attributes: gender, age when starting job search and the educational level. We also 
consider as an explanatory variable the three years before leaving the educational system average of 
public expenditure in education (in per capita terms) at the home region, and  a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 if there is an education department with specific budget to spend in public education during these 
three years.
10 Finally, we also include region, yearly and quarterly dummies and we control for the 
structural circumstances in the region by introducing the quarterly employment rate at the home region, 
and a variable measuring the local employment growth. 
Apart from the variables included as explanatory factors in the unemployment hazard rate,
11 in 
the employment hazard rate we also control for the type of contract, the sector and the type of job match. 
The type of job match refers to the comparison between job’s educational requirements and the 
educational attainments of workers. The measure of the type of job match is based on an objective 
method (See Cohn & Khan, 1995; Groot, 1993; Verdugo & Verdugo, 1989). In particular, a worker is 
defined as over-educated, if his/her years of education are above the mean educational attainments of the 
corresponding occupation plus one standard deviation. Adequately educated workers are those whose 
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educational level is higher than the mean educational level of the corresponding occupation minus one 
standard deviation, and lower than the mean occupational level plus one standard deviation. And finally, a 
worker is under-educated if his/her educational attainments are below the mean education of the 
corresponding occupation minus one standard deviation.
12  
The summary statistics of all variables used in our analysis, for both unemployment and 
employment spells, are provided in Table 6. It is worth mentioning that, when looking at complete 
unemployment durations, the average period of time spent by Spanish youths in finding a job after 
completing education is longer than one year. Table 7 shows the mean unemployment and employment 
durations by different categories: region, gender, educational level and date of entry. Looking at 
unemployment durations by region, the South-East region presents the shortest unemployment duration 
(around 12 months for the completed spells). In contrast, we observe the highest unemployment duration 
for the North-West region (more than 17 months). 
Regarding the educational level there are no significant differences at this descriptive level. 
Mean unemployment durations are slightly shorter for people with secondary and university education 
compared to those with primary education or those involved in professional schools (named in Spain 
“Formación Profesional”). We observe, in contrast, significant differences by gender. Females are clearly 
more likely to exhibit higher unemployment durations than males. However we do not appreciate 
significant differences between males and females as regards employment durations.   
We can also appreciate clear differences in the average unemployment duration by date of entry.  
As it can be observed the mean unemployment duration, for both censored and uncensored observations, 
clearly diminishes with the date of entry, so that the shortest unemployment durations are observed from 
2000 onwards. In contrast, employment durations show an increasing trend with the maximum level at 
1998 for uncensored employment durations. 
  
                                                 
12 Mean educational levels by occupation are constructed using data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey rotating 
panel, for the period 1993Q1 to 2002Q2. The classification of occupations provided by this data set follows the 
National Classification of Occupations (CNO-94), which is the most recent Spanish adaptation of the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). We use the two-digit level of CNO-94 to compute mean 
educational levels by occupation. The over-education index is then constructed taking into account the mean 
educational level of the corresponding occupation associated to the year when the individual found the job.    13
6.  Results 
The analysis of our results is based on separate estimations by level of education. First, we 
present the estimation of the hazard rates for both employment and unemployment durations separately, 
and second we provide the results obtained from a simultaneous estimation controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Table 8 reports the estimation results for the subsample of people with university 
education, and in Table 8’ we repeat the same estimations including an interaction of the variables 
“Expenditure” and “Competences”.
13 The results for the set of controls are quite standard. Male exits 
earlier from unemployment and suffer a lower exit rate from employment than females. Workers with a 
long university degree have a lower exit rate from employment. As expected, we find that workers 
holding a permanent contract exhibit a lower probability of leaving employment. Our results reveal that 
the better the economic situation in the region where the worker searches or works, the larger is the 
unemployment hazard rate. Finally, we do not observe a significant effect of search duration on the 
employment hazard rate. Nonetheless, longer employment durations seem to reduce the probability of 
leaving a job, as reflected by the coefficient on the variable Ln(te) in the employment hazard rate.   
The coefficient which raises most interest is the one associated with the public expenditure in 
university education, included as an explanatory factor in the search and employment equations. The 
estimated coefficient on this variable seems to be non-significant when looking at the results in Table 8. 
However, when the interaction between the variables “Expenditure” and “Competences” is included in 
the simultaneous equations estimation, we find that public expenditure in university education tends to 
increase the probability of getting a first job after completing education (see Table 8’). In this sense, 
investments in university education seem to improve the position of a worker in the labor market. 
However, we observe significant differences between those regions with and without decision-making 
authority over education. For those regions with competences in university education transferred, the odd 
ratio of the variable “Expenditure” is 1.20, while for those without these competences transferred it is 
                                                 
13 Both separate estimations for the unemployment and employment hazard rates and simultaneous estimations with 
unobserved heterogeneity are presented. In both, Table 8 and Table 8’, the results are in favour of the existence of 
unobserved factors affecting both employment and unemployment durations.   14
found to be 28.10. 
14 Thus, public expenditure on university education seems to increase the probability 
of finding a first job after completing schooling especially in those regions where educational spending 
responsibilities were under control of the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, the odd ratio for the 
variable “Competences” is 0.257, suggesting that the unemployment hazard rate is 74.3 percent lower in 
those regions with decision-making authority over university education. Finally, we do not observe 
significant effects of decentralization and public expenditure on education on the probability of leaving 
employment.
15  
Figure 1 presents the variation in the unemployment hazard rate for the subsample of people with 
university education, when we increase public expenditure on education. We simulate increases of 10% 
and 20% in regional public expenditure in university education. As can be observed, school-leavers are 
more likely to leave the first period of unemployment, the higher the value of public expenditure in 
education. This effect is particularly important for unemployment durations between 12 and 24 months, 
where we observe the major differences among the three lines that represent the hazard rates. We can 
conclude, therefore, that Government’s efforts in terms of university education seems contributing to the 
success in the transition process from school to work. Nonetheless, public expenditure in education does 
not play any role in lowering the probability of leaving that job (see Figure 3). 
The estimation results corresponding to the subsample of people with non-university education 
are reported in Tables 9 and 9’.
16 In the search equation, unemployment duration-dependence has been 
taken into account through the inclusion of a three-grade polynomial in ln(tu). In the employment 
equation, in contrast, employment duration dependence is taken into account through the inclusion of a 
one-grade polynomial in ln(te ). As it occurred with the subsample of people with university education, 
public expenditure on non-university education significantly increases the individual likelihood of leaving 
the first period of unemployment, but only when the interaction variable “Expenditure*Competences” is 
                                                 
14  () Odd ratio exp β γ =+  for regions with competences in education, and  () Odd ratio exp β =  for regions 
without competences in education, where β  and γ  are the estimated coefficient of the variables “Expenditure” and 
“Expenditure*Competences” respectively, reported in Table 8’. 
15 We also tried to account for employment duration-dependence through the inclusion of a two-grade polynomial in 
ln(te), but the coefficients keep on being non-significant. 
16 In Table 9’ we have added as an explanatory factor an interaction for the variables “Expenditure” and  
“Competences”  referred to non-university education.   15
included. However, in contrast to the case of university education, no significant differences are observed 
between those regions with and without decision-making authority over education. 
As we did for the subsample of people with university education, we simulate increases of 10% 
and 20% in regional public expenditure on non-university education, and we analyze the variations in the 
unemployment hazard rates (see Figure 2). School-leavers are found to be more likely to leave the first 
period of unemployment the higher the value of public expenditure on education. And this effect is 
particularly significant for unemployment durations between 12 and 24 months. However, as can be 
observed, the magnitude of the effect is smaller than in the case of university education. The same 
exercise is done for the employment hazard rate (see Figure 4). And in this case, we also compute the 
employment hazard rate separately, for those regions with and without an educational department with a 
specific budget to spend in public education (see Figures 4 (a) and 4 (b)). It is worth of mentioning that 
the employment hazard rates are higher in those regions decision-making authority over education. 
Furthermore, increasing public expenditure in education does not seem to reduce the employment hazard 
rate in these regions. In contrast, in those regions where competences in terms of education have not been 
transferred from the Central Administration, the employment hazard rates are lower, and clearly 
decreasing in the amount of public expenditure on education. Of course, these results are obtained once 
we have controlled for any other variable that could be affecting such hazard rates. 
As it occurred for the case of people with university education, males are clearly more likely 
than females to get a job after completing education, but in this case they also exhibit a lower probability 
of leaving the first job. Regarding the educational variables, we find that higher levels of non-university 
education tend to increase the probability of getting a job. Furthermore, we observe people with primary 
education being the most likely to leave employment. We observe a positive and significant effect of the 
local employment rate on the probability of leaving unemployment, as it occurred in the case of people 
with university education. And finally, our results reveal that over-educated workers are more likely to 
leave the first job than those correctly allocated. 
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper is intended to analyze how regional governments’ decisions affect the successfulness 
of the transition process from school to work at the individual level. This is a question of political   16
relevance in Spain, where the management of the educational system has been progressively transferred 
from the Central Administration to Regional Governments. Since this process has taken place, in the 
different regions, at different moments in time, it turns out of paramount importance to analyze the cross-
regional variability in public spending in order to identify its effect over the transition process from 
school to work.  
For this purpose we use a sample of individuals aged 16-35 years old extracted from the Spanish 
Labor Force Survey rotating panel, for the period 1993-2002. Furthermore, we use the information 
provided by the Spanish Ministry of Education and the Spanish Statistics Institute to obtain data on public 
expenditure on education, at the regional level, for the three years before the individual left the 
educational system. As both, unemployment and employment hazard rates have been considered as good 
indicators of labor market performance, we estimate a simultaneous equation model for these hazard rates 
where both, public expenditure on education in per capita terms and decision-making authority over 
education are included as explanatory factors. The analysis is made for people with university and non-
university education separately. With respect of university education, our results reveal that the chances 
of finding the first job after completing education are significantly higher for those individuals attending 
school in regions funding university education at higher levels. Furthermore decentralization of the 
educational system seems to have negative outcomes in terms of efficiency, since the unemployment 
hazard rate is found to be higher when the individual attended education in a region without decision-
making authority over education. Besides, the positive effect of public expenditure on education in terms 
of increasing the unemployment hazard rate is found to be much higher in those regions where 
educational spending has not been transferred from the Central Administration. In contrast, the effect of 
these factors on the employment hazard rate seems to be non-significant. Regarding non-university 
education we again find a positive effect of per capita educational spending on the probability of finding a 
first job. Nonetheless, in this case we do not find significant differences between those regions with and 
without decision-making authority over education.  
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Appendix  
Tables 
Table 1: Public expenditure on non-university education (thousands euros) 
    1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
TOTAL  12.658.929 13.212.530 13.576.537 14.402.971 15.148.196 15.663.758 16.420.286 17.872.289 18.927.260 20.101.872 
Ministry of Education and regional 
governments (CCAA) with an 
education department  11.457.669 12.062.170 12.334.939 13.118.781 13.868.993 14.384.448 15.270.984 16.802.441 17.916.044 18.967.195 
Ministry  of  Education  4.400.845 4.601.036 4.624.956 5.008.162 5.263.147 5.356.478 5.430.475 4.135.594  709.475  474.412 
Andalusia  2.167.507 2.169.943 2.226.970 2.370.345 2.502.982 2.547.429 2.694.629 2.858.491 3.044.315 3.232.983 
Aragón -  -----  - 437.154 488.943 519.099 
A s t u r i a s     -  -----  -- 421.918 457.065 
B a l e a r i c  I s l a n d s   -   -----   252.206 317.533 344.915 396.606 
Canary  Islands  616.421 628.401 674.170 747.973 809.047 832.190 877.928 991.207 975.195  1.006.278 
C a n t a b r i a   -  -----  - 215.120 235.024 234.501 
Castilla y León  -  -----  -- 1 . 070.803 1.159.332 
Castilla-La Mancha  -  -----  -- 771.032 881.216 
Catalunya  1.508.195 1.664.139 1.689.914 1.743.875 1.853.480 2.029.454 2.114.026 2.276.231 2.397.731 2.498.686 
Valencian  Community  1.007.035 1.075.362 1.130.736 1.159.118 1.236.615 1.298.924 1.410.721 1.566.774 1.698.795 1.844.148 
E x t r e m a d u r a   -  -----  -- 472.695 566.485 
Galicia  801.794  862.955  914.099  935.422  978.603 1.035.368 1.128.581 1.194.579 1.207.862 1.239.163 
M a d r i d   -  -----  - 943.213 1.879.998 2.068.492 
M u r c i a     -  -----  - 249.475 533.178 575.282 
Navarra  192.465 206.344 213.420 227.217 246.426 261.124 271.300 283.913 306.522 330.887 
Basque  Country  763.407  853.990  860.674  926.669  978.693 1.023.481 1.091.118 1.234.045 1.240.379 1.354.640 
L a   R i o j a   -  -----  - 9 9 . 112 117.264 127.920 





Table 2: Deflated public expenditure on non-university education (in per capita terms) 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Andalusia 1,340  1,292 1,285 1,326 1,381 1,416  1,507 1,598 1,663 1,725
Canary Islands  1,691  1,634 1,689 1,798 1,913 1,926  2,006 2,259 2,197 2,231
Cataluña 1,255  1,325 1,326 1,345 1,420 1,568  1,653 1,772 1,808 1,815
Valencian Community  1,259  1,299 1,346 1,396 1,450 1,526  1,651 1,838 1,942 2,035
Galicia 1,474  1,525 1,591 1,606 1,682 1,818  2,026 2,189 2,231 2,345
Navarra 1,952  2,038 2,052 2,141 2,275 2,404  2,515 2,621 2,791 2,865
Basque country  1,815  2,014 2,015 2,139 2,269 2,432  2,642 2,997 2,983 3,200
Rest of CCAA  1,446  1,463 1,435 1,514 1,567 1,602  1,710 1,919 2,071 2,089
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Table 3: Public expenditure on university education (thousands euros) 
    1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
TOTAL  3.084.794 3.339.655 3.480.047 3.844.929 4.235.272 4.758.480 4.836.156 5.124.665 5.569.937 6.025.913 
Ministry of Education and 
regional governments (CCAA) 
with an education department  3.052.222 3.300.594 3.435.486 3.793.092 4.206.984 4.728.297 4.805.161 5.089.476 5.536.313 5.984.635 
             
Ministry  of  Education  1.269.500  1.364.820  1.384.489  1.485.989 202.545 130.474 130.474 147.314 154.351 182.594 
Andalusia  472.835 511.029 576.072 631.225 672.265 690.480 754.785 781.701 867.180 928.444 
Aragón  -  - - - 124.077 127.805 136.203 140.631 163.474 166.985 
Asturias    -  - - - 118.773 139.212 139.301 139.301 154.874 156.215 
B a l e a r i c  I s l a n d s   -   ---- 4 8 . 912 48.183 46.019 49.318 60.955 
Canary  Islands  158.592 157.439 158.203 158.367 164.802 168.711 185.599 192.498 205.499 225.168 
Cantabria  -  - - - 53.310 62.989 57.282 63.226 70.216 66.621 
Castilla y León  -  - - - 274.394  307.605 336.144 364.263 395.040 383.586 
Castilla-La Mancha  -  - - - 64.353  79.022 94.872 87.063  121.406 135.522 
Catalunya  550.428 596.387 614.209 679.909 744.361 757.341 749.228 792.636 852.804 913.284 
Valencian  Community  258.367 286.338 290.805 385.088 448.267 636.404 595.447 597.981 623.234 690.803 
Extremadura  -  - - - 61.692 67.971 81.431 83.414 96.005 96.984 
Galicia  154.846 186.695 207.853 240.835 271.880 259.200 285.254 335.245 347.672 354.886 
Madrid  -  - - - 678.898 875.798 819.198 872.267 956.071  1.129.019 
Murcia    -  - - - 85.138  95.902 110.940 138.249 151.311 160.954 
Navarra  40.407 34.962 30.708 31.616 36.615 42.207 43.710 50.327 57.971 53.369 
Basque  Country  147.247 162.924 173.147 180.063 188.554 216.504 209.590 226.838 237.527 253.476 
La  Rioja  -  - - - 17.060 21.760 27.520 30.503 32.360 25.770 
Other public administrations   30.132 28.377 33.780 34.943 28.288 30.183 30.995 35.468 34.261 41.785 




Table 4: Deflated public expenditure on university education (in per capita terms) 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Andalusia 2,416  2,263 2,281 2,217 2,182 2,158  2,282 2,337 2,565 2,690
Canary Islands  4,159  3,588 3,319 2,948 2,933 2,820  3,038 3,076 3,287 3,527
Cataluña 3,283  3,238 3,121 3,289 3,394 3,450  3,335 3,447 3,651 3,849
Valencian Community  2,236  2,260 2,088 2,547 2,788 3,813  3,350 3,307 3,481 3,747
Galicia 2,114  2,249 2,181 2,288 2,430 2,171  2,343 2,699 2,822 2,829
Navarra 5,884  4,149 3,135 2,868 3,222 3,245  3,303 4,039 4,581 4,643
Basque country  2,604  2,716 2,660 2,538 2,471 2,869  2,723 3,000 3,202 3,440
Rest of CCAA  2,188  2,112 2,019 2,027 2,108 2,373  2,386 2,490 2,818 3,038
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Table 5: Variable Definition 
Variable Equation  Definition 
Male  1, 2  Dummy variable indicating the individual is male 
Age    
14-20  1, 2  Years when starting search (job): 14-20 
20-25  1, 2  Years when starting search (job): 20-25 
25-30  1, 2  Years when starting search (job): 25-30 
30-35  1, 2  Years when starting search (job): 30-35 
Educational Level    
Illiteracy  1, 2  Dummy variable indicating the individual has no estudies 
Primary Ed.  1, 2  Dummy variable indicating the individual has primary education 
Secondary Ed. (1
st Stage)  1, 2  Dummy variable indicating the individual has 1
st Stage secondary 
education 
Secondary Ed. (2
nd Stage)  1, 2  Dummy variable indicating the individual has 2











1, 2  Dummy variable indicating the individual has 2
nd Stage 
“formación profesional” 
Short  1, 2  Dummy variable indicating the individual has three years of 
university education 
Long  1, 2  Dummy variable indicating the individual has more than three 
years of university education 
Educational Expenditure    
University Education  1, 2   Average public expenditure (per capita) in university education 
of the 3 years before leaving the educational system 
Non-University Education  1, 2  Average public expenditure (per capita) in non-university 
education of the 3 years before leaving the educational system 
Region    
North-West  1, 2  Dummy variable for the North-West region 
North-East  1, 2  Dummy variable for the North-East region 
Middle  1, 2  Dummy variable for the Middle region 
South-West  1, 2  Dummy variable for the South-West region 
South-East  1, 2  Dummy variable for the South-East region 
Year    
Y93-Y03  1, 2  Yearly dummy variables 
Permanent Contract  2  Dummy variable indicating a permanent contract 
Sector    
A0-A9 2  Sectorial  dummy  variables 
Type of Job Match    
Over-educated  2  Dummy variable indicating the individual is over-educated 
Adeq. Educated  2  Dummy variable indicating the individual is adequately educated 
Under-educated  2  Dummy variabel indicating the individual is under-educated 
Business Cycle    
Growth 1,  2  (Employedt,j-Employedt-1,j)/ Employedt-1,j 
Employment Rate  1, 2  Employed/People older than 16 
Quarter    
Q1-Q4  1, 2  Quarterly dummy variables 
Competences  1, 2  Dummy variable indicating the region had competences in 
university/non-university education in the 3 years before the 
individual left the school 
Equation (1) :  Unemployment hazard rate 




Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
  Unemployment Employment 








    Mean Std.  Dev Mean Std.  Dev Mean  Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev 
tu  12,300 10,207  27,912 13,431  13,676 12,233  12,854 10,931 
             
te        3,856  3,378  13,573  7,134 
             
Male  0,491 0,500  0,327 0,469  0,451 0,498  0,514 0,500 
             
Age             
14-20  0,398 0,489  0,377 0,485  0,302 0,460  0,253 0,435 
20-25  0,451 0,498  0,437 0,496  0,467 0,499  0,458 0,498 
25-30  0,133 0,339  0,145 0,353 
30-35  0,018 0,133  0,041 0,198 
0,231 0,422  0,289 0,453 
             
Educational Level             
Illiteracy 0,000  0,022 0,001  0,034 
Primary  Education  0,051 0,219  0,081 0,273 
0,076 0,265  0,041 0,199 
Secondary  Education  0,474 0,499  0,454 0,498  0,458 0,499  0,422 0,494 
“Formación  Profesional”  0,176 0,381  0,190 0,393  0,200 0,401  0,190 0,393 
University  Education  0,300 0,458  0,273 0,446  0,265 0,442  0,346 0,476 
             
Educational Expenditure             
Non-university  education 1,662 0,290  1,516 0,214  1,584 0,248  1,658 0,291 
University  education  2,560 0,477  2,348 0,386  2,463 0,457  2,544 0,471 
             
Region
17             
North-West  0,115 0,319  0,197 0,398  0,123 0,329  0,136 0,343 
North_East  0,243 0,429  0,148 0,355  0,214 0,410  0,243 0,429 
Middle  0,240 0,427  0,238 0,426  0,221 0,415  0,259 0,438 
South-West  0,269 0,444  0,337 0,473  0,315 0,465  0,237 0,425 
South-East  0,133 0,340  0,080 0,271  0,128 0,334  0,124 0,330 
             
Permanent Contract        0,049  0,217  0,273  0,446 
             
Type of Job Match             
Over-educated        0,097  0,297  0,109  0,311 
Adeq.  Educated        0,761  0,426  0,789  0,408 
Under-educated        0,141  0,348  0,102  0,303 
             
Business Cycle             
Growth  0,043 0,023  0,029 0,027  0,042 0,023  0,045 0,021 
Employment  Rate  0,430 0,051  0,390 0,043  0,429 0,047  0,446 0,049 
             
Quarter             
Q1  0,239 0,427  0,364 0,481  0,234 0,424  0,237 0,425 
Q2  0,230 0,421  0,176 0,381  0,246 0,431  0,214 0,411 
Q3  0,282 0,450  0,308 0,462  0,274 0,446  0,281 0,449 
Q4  0,249 0,432  0,153 0,360  0,245 0,430  0,268 0,443 
             
Competences             
Non-university  education 0,575 0,494  0,538 0,499  0,587 0,493  0,539 0,499 
University  education  0,786 0,410  0,608 0,488  0,670 0,471  0,760 0,427 
             
Educational expenditure & 
competences 
           
Non-university  education 0,974 0,882  0,815 0,782  0,940 0,824  0,915 0,889 
University  education  2,105 1,177  1,530 1,271  1,763 1,298  2,035 1,214 
 
                                                 
17  North-West: Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria; North-East: Cataluña, Aragón, Navarra, País Vasco; Middle: Castilla-
León, Castilla La Mancha, Madrid; South-West: Extremadura, Andalucía, Canarias; South-East: Comunidad 




Table 7: Mean Unemployment and Employment Durations 
   Unemployment  Employment 
   Mean Std.Deviation N Mean Std.Deviation  N
North-West   
t (i)  31.796 15.154 529 11.285 7.265  280
t (c)  17.135 15.049 538 3.573 3.038  143
North_East   
t (i)  28799 14.691 492 13.948 7.225  484
t (c)  11.921 9.836 1102 3.858 3.671  239
Middle   
t (i)  29.622 13.870 682 12.401 7.179  536
t (c)  14.458 12.642 1100 3.457 2.717  236
South-West   
t (i)  30.223 14.691 962 11.936 7.161  486
t (c) 14.887 12.895 1240 3.631 3.199  342
South-East   
t (i) 27.553 13.324 262 13.529 7.052  255
REGION 
t (c) 12.226 11.159 618 3.683 3.305  139
   
Male   
t (i)  29.284 14.187 946 13.723 6.991  1038
t (c) 12.678 11.347 2242 3.788 3.287  501
Female   
t (i)  30.178 14.657 1981 11.529 7.319  1003
GENDER 
t (c) 15.217 13.096 2356 3.520 3.130  598
   
Primary Ed.   
t (i)  31.861 14.879 287 12.325 6.602  89
t (c) 14.542 12.861 262 3.385 2.881  96
Secondary Ed.   
t (i)  29.646 14.685 1301 12.545 7.362  866
t (c) 13.780 12.144 2168 3.536 3.217  507
Form. Profesional   
t (i)  30.053 14.683 599 12.190 7.194  399
t (c) 14.937 13.472 840 4.000 3.411  222
University Ed.   
t (i)  29.417 13.867 740 13.077 7.171  687
EDUC. LEVEL 
t (c) 13.587 11.764 1328 3.638 3.106  274
   
1993   
t (i)  33.512 15.974 642 5.993 3.752  140
t (c) 26.796 17.606 290 2.772 2.111  101
1994   
t (i)  31.569 14.846 599 6.405 3.980  116
t (c) 25.529 18.608 270 2.667 2.027  105
1995   
t (i)  30.953 14.988 513 5.932 3.925  147
t (c) 23.117 16.951 316 2.902 2.035  112
1996   
t (i)  28.032 13.159 433 6.630 4.373  154
t (c) 21.389 14.421 342 3.207 2.420  130
1997   
t (i)  27.670 13.940 285 8.040 4.794  172
t (c) 17.706 12.603 310 2.480 1.844  102
1998   
t (i)  28.184 11.797 195 14.700 6.866  394
t (c) 10.796 7.710 919 5.346 4.263  358
1999   
t (i)  23.753 9.094 134 16.486 6.089  409
t (c) 9.743 6.142 934 2.938 2.175  81
2000   
t (i)  20.988 6.597 83 17.016 5.850  367
t (c) 8.934 4.486 856 2.724 1.862  69
2001   
t (i)  17.512 5.153 41 15.298 6.268  141
t (c) 7.988 3.670 350 2.8 2.069  35
2002   
t (i)  9.000 9.899 2 14 .  1
DATE ENTRY 
t (c) 3.364 3.828 11 1.667 0.817  6
i: incomplete duration 
c: complete duration  
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Table 8: Unemployment and employment hazard rates. University education 
  Separate Estimations  Simultaneous Estimation with 
unobserved  heterogeneity 
  Unemployment Employment  Unemployment  Employment 
  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t 
Ln(tu) -0,174  -0,57  0,065  0,72  -0,432 -1,37 0,072  0,78 
Ln(tu)
2  0,754  4,19    0,938  4,94   
Ln(tu)
3  -0,197  -6,35    -0,225  -6,92   
Ln(te)     -0,717  -8,59      -0,697  -8,21 
Male 0,285  4,55  -0,229  -1,52  0,324 4,57  -0,226  -1,46 
Age
18          
15-20  - - - - - - - - 
20-25  0,070  0,50 - -  -0,003  -0,02 - - 
25-35 0,028  0,20  0,115  0,76  -0,042 -0,26 0,117  0,75 
Educational Level          
Short  - - - - - - - - 
Long -0,015  -0,25  -0,497  -3,41 0,024  0,34  -0,508 -3,38 
Expenditure
19  0,196 1,69  0,356 1,29  0,172 1,31  0,352 1,25 
Region          
North-West -0,300  -2,60  -0,140  -0,51  -0,324 -2,51  -0,128 -0,45 
North_East -0,032  -0,30  -0,209  -0,77  -0,076 -0,62  -0,210 -0,76 
Middle  - - - - - - - - 
South-West 0,050  0,42  0,328 1,20  0,100 0,74  0,338  1,2 
South-East 0,243  2,04  0,033 0,13  0,314 2,34  0,037 0,14 
Permanent Contract     -2,414  -6,61    -2,444  -6,66 
Type of Job Match          
Over-educated     0,186  1,17      0,176  1,08 
Adeq.  Educated     - -     - - 
Under-educated     0,264  0,47      0,233  0,40 
Business Cycle          
Employment Rate  4,379  3,24  -3,269 -1,05  5,426  3,53  -3,308 -1,02 
Growth -0,837  -0,43  -1,875  -0,44  -1,103  -0,55  -1,736  -0,4 
Quarter          
Q1 -0,568  -6,13  0,077  0,37 -0,631  -6,48  0,082  0,39 
Q2 -0,297  -3,47  0,203  1,01  -0,343  -3,9  0,208  1,02 
Q3 -0,047  -0,58  0,302  1,59 -0,076  -0,91  0,310  1,62 
Q4  - - - - - - - - 
Competences
20  -0,108 -1,08  -0,436 -2,03  -0,132 -1,18  -0,437 -1,97 
Constant -7,223  -12,60  -1,385  -1,09 -7,581 -12,14 -1,467  -1,12 
Pr         0,912 20,86 0,912 20,86 
η          0,175 1,78  0,175 1,78 
N 27210  9461  36671 
Log likelihood  -4482  -906  -5385 
Yearly dummies included in unemployment and employment equations. 
Sector dummies included in employment equation 
 
                                                 
18 Age at time when starting to search 
19 Public expenditure in education (average of the 3 years before finishing education) 
20 The region (CCAA) had an educational department during the 3 years before finishing education  
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Table 8’: Unemployment and employment hazard rates. University education 
  Separate Estimations  Simultaneous Estimation with 
unobserved  heterogeneity 
  Unemployment Employment Unemployment  Employment 
  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef.  t 
Ln(tu) -0,164  -0,54  0,058  0,62  -0,459 -1,45 0,065 0,68 
Ln(tu)
2  0,746 4,14      0,955 4,99     
Ln(tu)
3  -0,195 -6,28      -0,226 -6,91     
Ln(te)     -0,718  -8,60     -0,695  -8,15 
Male 0,283  4,52  -0,229  -1,52  0,332 4,58  -0,226  -1,45 
Age
21            
15-20            
20-25  0,072 0,51      0,005 0,03     
25-35  0,030 0,22  0,113 0,75 -0,027 -0,17 0,116 0,74 
Educational Level            
S h o r t             
Long  -0,009 -0,14  -0,499 -3,42 0,034  0,47  -0,512  -3,39 
Expenditure
22  1,911 1,64  -0,319  -0,14  3,336 2,36  -0,455  -0,19 
Region            
North-West -0,321  -2,76  -0,133  -0,48 -0,372  -2,76  -0,119  -0,42 
North_East  -0,037 -0,34  -0,207 -0,77 -0,098  -0,79  -0,208  -0,75 
M i d d l e             
South-West 0,031  0,25  0,335 1,21  0,056 0,40  0,349  1,22 
South-East 0,224  1,87  0,041 0,15  0,275 2,01  0,046  0,17 
Permanent Contract     -2,414  -6,61     -2,448  -6,67 
Type of Job Match               
Over-educated     0,182  1,14     0,172  1,04 
Adeq.  Educated               
Under-educated     0,249  0,44     0,210  0,36 
Business Cycle               
Employment Rate  4,196  3,10  -3,219 -1,03  5,183  3,34  -3,244  -1,00 
Growth  -0,953 -0,49  -1,743 -0,41 -1,285  -0,63  -1,572  -0,36 
Quarter            
Q1 -0,564  -6,09  0,073  0,35 -0,635  -6,49  0,078  0,37 
Q2 -0,294  -3,44  0,200  0,99 -0,346  -3,93  0,205  1,01 
Q3 -0,046  -0,56  0,301  1,58 -0,078  -0,93  0,310  1,61 
Q 4             
Competences
23  3,528 1,43  -1,876  -0,38  6,558 2,20  -2,159  -0,41 
Expenditure*Competences  -1,707 -1,48 0,676  0,29  -3,152 -2,25 0,808 0,33 
Constant -10,780  -4,37  0,035  0,01 -14,181 -4,73 0,213 0,04 
Pr       0,897  18.87  0,897  18.87 
η       0,205  1.93  0,205  1.93 
N 27210  9461  36671 
Log likelihood  -4481  -906  -5382 
Yearly dummies included in unemployment and employment equations. 
Sector dummies included in employment equation 
 
                                                 
21 Age at time when starting to search 
22 Public expenditure in university education (average of the 3 years before finishing education) 
23 The region (CCAA) had an educational department with competences in university education during the 3 years 
before finishing education  
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Table 9: Unemployment and employment hazard rates. Non-University education 
  Separate Estimations  Simultaneous Estimation with 
unobserved  heterogeneity 
  Unemployment Employment  Unemployment Employment 
  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef.  t  Coef. t 
Ln(tu) -0,910  -4,91  0,153  2,99  -1,23 -6,30  0,17 3,16 
Ln(tu)
2  1,178 10,49      1,40  11,56     
Ln(tu)
3 -0,263  -13,47      -0,30  -14,27     
Ln(te)     -0,639  -12,66      -0,61  -11,77 
Male 0,479  11,93  -0,297  -3,15  0,55 12,01  -0,31  -3,14 
Age            
14-20  - - - - -  -  - - 
20-25 -0,097  -2,03  0,092  0,91 -0,07  -1,28  0,10  0,98 
25-30  -0,133  -1,7  -0,034 -0,22 -0,10  -1,20  -0,02 -0,11 
30-35  -0,251  -1,75    -0,21  -1,34     
Educational level             
Primary Ed.  -0,340  -4,07  0,542 2,43  -0,38 -4,13  0,53 2,30 
Secondary Ed. (1
st Stage)  -0,246  -4,71  0,131  1,11 -0,21  -3,52  0,12  0,98 
Secondary Ed. (2
nd  Stage)  - - - - -  -  - - 
Form. Profesional (1
st Stage)  -0,060  -0,67  0,112  0,67 -0,06  -0,61  0,10  0,55 
Form. Profesional (2
nd Stage)  0,116  2,01  -0,142  -1,11 0,13  1,99 -0,16  -1,22 
Expenditure
24            
Expenditure 7,207  1,36  0,147 0,73  13,13  2,30  0,19 0,89 
Expenditure
2 -3,540  -1,32      -6,55  -2,25     
Expenditure
3 0,560  1,26      1,05  2,18     
Region               
North-West -0,207  -2,46  -0,147  -0,85 -0,27  -2,88  -0,19 -1,05 
North_East 0,213  2,65  0,070  0,43 0,23  2,56  0,09 0,53 
Middle  - - - - -  -  - - 
South-West 0,081  0,91  0,049 0,28 0,07  0,74  0,00 0,02 
South-East 0,247  3,06  0,159 0,91 0,23  2,55  0,17 0,93 
Permanent Contract     -1,635  -9,3      -1,66  -9,40 
Type of Job Match                
Over-educated    0,599  1,65      0,61  1,63 
Adeq. Educated      -  -      -  - 
Under-educated     -0,163  -1,05      -0,17  -1,05 
Business Cycle                
Employment Rate  3,168  3,74  -3,029 -2,20  3,11  3,13  -3,96 -2,27 
Growth  -0,560 -0,46  -0,972 -0,38 -0,51  -0,41  -0,78 -0,30 
Quarter            
Q1  -0,244 -4,01  -0,058 -0,45 -0,32  -5,01  -0,06 -0,47 
Q2  0,026 0,45  0,095 0,78  -0,02 -0,42  0,09 0,75 
Q3  0,206 3,66  0,367 3,24 0,19  3,26  0,37 3,21 
Q4  - - - - -  -  - - 
Competences
25 -0,085  -1,34  0,280  2,41  -0,06 -0,91  0,31 2,53 
Constant  -11,058 -3,32  -1,108 -1,68 -14,93  -4,19  -0,93  -1,21 
Pr       0,935  44,42  0,935  44,42 
η       0,198  2,37  0,198  2,37 
N 69413  18209 87622 
Log likelihood  -10560  -2382  -12919 
Yearly dummies included in unemployment and employment equations. 
Sector dummies included in employment equation 
 
                                                 
24 Public expenditure in non-university education (average of the 3 years before finishing education) 
25 The region (CCAA) had an educational department with competences in non-university education during the 3 
years before finishing education  
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Table 9’: Unemployment and employment hazard rates. Non-University education 
  Separate Estimations  Simultaneous Estimation with 
unobserved  heterogeneity 
  Unemployment Employment  Unemployment  Employment 
  Coef.  t  Coef. t  Coef. t  Coef.  t 
Ln(tu) -0,909  -4,91  0,128  2,44  -1,228 -6,30 0,142  2,60 
Ln(tu)
2  1,178  10,49     1,401  11,55    
Ln(tu)
3  -0,263  -13,46     -0,295  -14,26    
Ln(te)     -0,647  -12,79     -0,620  -11,90 
Male 0,479  11,93  -0,296  -3,14  0,548 12,01  -0,308  -3,15 
Age             
14-20  -  - - -  - - -  - 
20-25 -0,097  -2,03  0,079  0,78 -0,067  -1,28  0,090  0,86 
25-30 -0,133  -1,70  -0,051  -0,33 -0,103  -1,20  -0,035 -0,22 
30-35  -0,251  -1,75     -0,214  -1,34    
Educational level              
Primary Ed.  -0,340  -4,07  0,540 2,41 -0,381  -4,12  0,533  2,29 
Secondary Ed. (1
st Stage)  -0,246  -4,71  0,128  1,08 -0,212  -3,52  0,116  0,94 
Secondary Ed. (2
nd  Stage)  -  - - -  - - -  - 
Form. Profesional (1
st Stage)  -0,060  -0,67  0,102  0,61 -0,060  -0,61  0,084  0,48 
Form. Profesional (2
nd Stage)  0,116  2,01  -0,138  -1,08 0,128  1,99  -0,159  -1,20 
Expenditure
26             
Expenditure 7,351  1,33  -1,301  -1,59 13,145 2,24  -1,257 -1,49 
Expenditure
2  -3,602  -1,30     -6,557  -2,21    
Expenditure
3  0,571  1,24     1,055  2,13    
Region              
North-West -0,206  -2,45  -0,162  -0,93 -0,270  -2,86  -0,206 -1,13 
North_East 0,212  2,64  0,077  0,47 0,229  2,56  0,094 0,55 
Middle  -  - - -  - - -  - 
South-West 0,081  0,92  0,035  0,19 0,073  0,73  -0,010  -0,05 
South-East 0,247  3,06  0,169 0,97  0,233 2,55  0,174  0,96 
Permanent Contract     -1,637  -9,32     -1,668  -9,41 
Type of Job Match               
Over-educated     0,647  1,78     0,659  1,74 
Adeq.  Educated     -  -     -  - 
Under-educated     -0,155  -0,99     -0,161  -1,00 
Business Cycle               
Employment Rate  3,176  3,73  -3,285 -2,35  3,110  3,11  -4,161  -2,34 
Growth -0,563  -0,46  -0,917  -0,36 -0,514  -0,41  -0,716 -0,27 
Quarter             
Q1 -0,244  -3,95  -0,078  -0,60 -0,317  -4,95  -0,081 -0,62 
Q2 0,026  0,45  0,081  0,67  -0,025 -0,42 0,077  0,63 
Q3 0,206  3,66  0,360  3,17 0,186  3,26  0,360 3,14 
Q4  -  - - -  - - -  - 
Competences
27 -0,038  -0,07  -2,006  -1,60  -0,059 -0,10  -1,968  -1,52 
Expenditure*Competences  -0,029 -0,09  1,463  1,82  -0,003 -0,01 1,456  1,77 
Constant -11,176  -3,12  1,255  0,87 -14,942 -3,96 1,405  0,92 
Pr        0,935  44,43  0,935  44,43 
η        0,197  2,35  0,197  2,35 
N 69413  18209 87622 
Log likelihood  -10560  -2380  -12917 
Yearly dummies included in unemployment and employment equations. 
Sector dummies included in employment equation 
 
 
                                                 
26 Public expenditure in non-university education (average of the 3 years before finishing education) 
27 The region (CCAA) had an educational department with competences in non-university education during the 3 























































                                                 
28 The figures present the variations in the unemployment and employment hazard rates, for the subsamples of people 
with university and non-university education, when we simulate increases of 10% and 20% in regional public 
expenditure in education.  
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Figure 4 a): Employment Hazard Rate (Non-University Education)




























Figure 4 b): Employment Hazard Rate (Non-University Education)
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